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Will Economics Become an 
Experimental Science?* 
CHARLES R. PLOTT 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, California 
The expectations of the audience are rational because the answer I will give to the question posed 
by the title of this lecture is exactly what they expect. The answer is "yes." No doubt the expec- 
tations are also that I will not give a one-word lecture. A justification of such a radical answer 
is expected. Again, the expectations are rational. The natural way for me to explain my belief is 
to focus on the events that have facilitated and will continue to facilitate the broad application of 
laboratory experimental methods. Economics has been a non-laboratory science for several hun- 
dred years. Many have used economics as a classical example of a science in which laboratory 
methods are impossible. What has happened to make experimental methods applicable now and 
thereby change the way in which one can learn about economics? That question is the focus of 
this lecture. 
The sheer growth of papers, researchers, and laboratories suggests that something has hap- 
pened. From the early 1970s the number of papers has grown from two or three per year to 
numbers approximating 100 per year. The number of researchers has grown from a small handful 
in the early 1970s to hundreds. The number of locations of the research, and the number of labo- 
ratories have grown from one or two to the range of 30 or 40. The growth is amazing but these 
are just trends. Such trends do not show the basic logic that is at work. The logic, the reasons 
for the activities, provides the proper support for the answer to the question posed in the title. 
The trends are simply manifestations of the logic and events. 
Six Seductive Steps to Sin and Intoxication 
I think that the foundations for the revolution that we can now see occurring began to be developed 
in the early 1970s. These foundations consist of six events. Collectively these events provide the 
bases for the self-sustaining growth and use of experimental methods in both the basic scientific 
and in the applied scientific aspects of economics. Now, to me basic science is fun; so much so 
that it must be sinful. Experimentation is also intoxicating and habituating in the sense that the 
more one does the more one wants to do. Consequently I will refer to the six events that form the 
foundation for the growth of moder experimental methods as the "Six Seductive Steps to Sin 
and Intoxication." 
*Presidential Address delivered at the sixtieth annual meeting of the Southern Economic Association, New Orleans, 
November 20, 1990. The research support of the National Science Foundation and the California Institute of Technology 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Step 1: We Learned How to Pose a Question 
Prior to the early 1970s, the profession did not pose questions that could be answered by the ap- 
plication of experimental methodology. The questions primarily addressed aspects of economies 
as they are found growing wild in nature. Naturally occurring economies evolve in response to 
a wide variety of events and historical accidents. The possibility certainly exists that some of 
such events had nothing at all to do with any economic principles that might be at work. Econo- 
mies found "in the wild," so to speak, are extremely complicated and the questions posed by the 
profession had to do with the properties of such creatures. Primarily the questions were about 
measurement and about the statistical properties of ongoing processes. (What is the elasticity of 
demand? What is the relationship between concentration and profits? What is the level of em- 
ployment?) In order to learn about such statistical properties, the economy in question must be 
studied directly. The laboratory would seem to have nothing to contribute to such effort. The idea 
of performing replays of the historical evolution of an economy in order to get better observations 
does not make a lot of sense. Each observation would be very costly, to say the least. 
Of course not all questions were about measurement. Many questions were about theory but 
even the theories tended to be directed to explanations about particular economies and particular 
situations in those economics. (What was the contribution of monetary policy to the great de- 
pression? What was the contribution of debt policies to the inflation of the 1960s? What were 
the causes of slums and ghettos in New York City? What were the contributions of technological 
change to the growth of the U.S. economy? What was the relationship between structure and 
performance in specific industries?) If the analysis is restricted to only questions of this sort, then 
only the data from these special economies, as they are found naturally evolving during a particu- 
lar period of history, would seem to be relevant. Clearly, in many parts of economics a body of 
general theory had developed, but the focus of the profession was not so much on the general 
behavioral principles of the theory as it was on the application of theory to specific events. Again, 
in the absence of a capability to inexpensively replay history, a laboratory methodology would 
appear to have nothing to contribute. 
Laboratory methodology involves a shift from a focus on particular economies as they are 
found in the wild to a focus on general theories, models and principles that govern the behavior of 
economies. This distinction between the study of an economy and the study of models, theories 
and principles of economics is subtle so an elaboration might prove useful. The logic is as follows. 
General theories must apply to simple special cases. The laboratory technology can be used to 
create simple (but real) economies. These simple economies can then be used to test and evaluate 
the predictive capability of the general theories when they are applied to the special cases. In this 
way, a joining of the general theories with data is accomplished. 
Before continuing further, an example of a simple, laboratory economy consisting of one 
market will be given. People are assembled. Some of the people are designated as "buyers" and 
some are designated "sellers." Buyers are involved with the experimenter through a contract of 
the following sort. Buyer i is assigned a "redemption value" function, R (Xi) which indicates 
the amount of (real) dollars he or she will receive from the experimenter as a function of Xi, the 
quantity of the commodity purchased by i. The buyer i keeps as profits the difference between 
Ri(Xi) and whatever he or she paid to sellers for the units. Similarly, the experimenter's contract 
with seller j is that j will pay the experimenter an amount of dollars CJ (Xj) depending on the 
quantity, Xj, sold by j. Seller j keeps as (real dollar) profits the difference between the revenue 
he or she received from buyers and the cost paid to the experimenter. 
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If the competitive model is applied to the market, then each buyer can be represented by a de- 
mand function that satisfies the equation (dRi(Xi))/aXi - P = 0. Each seller can be represented 
by a supply function that satisfies the equation P - ac (Xj)/OXj = 0. That is, the individual quan- 
tity demanded is determined by an equating of price to marginal benefits and the individual 
quantity supplied is determined by an equating of price to marginal cost. The market demand 
is derived by a sum of individual demand functions and the market supply is determined by the 
sum of individual supply functions. The competitive model then predicts that the price will be 
the one that equates market demand with market supply. Clearly the law of supply and demand is 
applied very generally and to economies much more complicated than the one just described. It 
is only natural to expect that if the law works in very complicated cases then one should expect 
it to work in the simple case as well. If it does not then a substantial reassessment of the theory 
would be in order. The conclusion of many laboratory experiments is that it does indeed work in 
the simple cases. 
Figure 1-A displays the market demand and supply from a simple laboratory market con- 
ducted at Caltech. Figure 1-B shows the time series of trades that took place in the market. The 
market was organized by a computerized multiple unit double auction. The dots represent contract 
prices displayed in the order in which contracts occurred. The vertical lines are the end of market 
periods or "trading days." Each trading day was a replication of the previous day in the sense 
that the market demand and supply was the same. As can be seen, the time series approaches the 
prediction of the competitive model. Contract prices approach the competitive equilibrium price 
and volume approaches the competitive equilibrium volume as the trading periods are replicated. 
The demand and supply diagram is useful but it does not reflect the potential variety of labo- 
ratory applications that is possible. Almost all economic theories and models have the same form 
which elsewhere [17] I have called the "fundamental equation" represented in Figure 2. Almost 
all economic theories and models rest on concepts of preferences, technology, (or feasible sets), 
and institutions. These concepts form the basic parameters which are supposed to dictate the be- 
havior of the economy. The fundamental equation captures the essence of the relationships. Fix the 
preferences, the feasible set, and the institution (perhaps along with beliefs) and the models will 
yield a prediction. It is important to note that it makes no difference where the economy is found. 
The economy could have been found evolving in nature or it could have been a home-grown, 
laboratory variety; as long as the parameters are known, the theory will produce a prediction. It is 
this general property of theory that is important for laboratory experimental work. Figure 2 will 
help make the point more clearly. 
Theories and models can take many competing forms or be based on different principles of 
behavior and still have the properties of the fundamental equation. Those captured by the box in 
Figure 2 are examples. Given some fixed "economic environment" of preferences, institution, 
and feasible sets, the outcomes predicted could be based on any of a number of different co- 
operative game theoretic models or the prediction could be based on any of a large number of 
noncooperative models. Consider first the cooperative model options. Cooperative game models 
can differ according to the choice of dominance relations and can differ depending upon the nature 
of the characteristic function. Differences in models can also reflect different selections from the 
set of solution concepts (core, bargaining sets, etc.). Even within the class of cooperative game 
models the number of models that could be applied to the same environment is large. However, 
cooperative models do not exhaust the possibilities. The model applied to the same environment 
might be based on noncooperative theoretic principles. Noncooperative theories can differ ac- 
cording to hypotheses about the information structure generated by the institutional arrangement. 
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Figure 2. Fundamental Equation 
The number of possible models is also expanded by the choice of an equilibrium concept (Nash, 
perfect Nash, etc.). Cooperative games and non-cooperative games do not exhaust the possibili- 
ties. The model might be based on principles of nonstrategic behavior and yield outcomes like 
those predicted by the competitive model. The number of potential models is impressive. 
The lessons of Figure 2 are firstly, that models of economies found in the wild tend to have 
a similar structure and that structure is captured by the fundamental equation. Secondly, such 
models are general models involving basic principles intended to have applicability independent 
of time and location except to the extent to which time and location have an effect on the variables 
of the fundamental equation, (preferences, institutions, information, and feasible sets). Third, we 
see that a staggeringly large number of theories exist. One purpose of the laboratory is to reduce 
the number by determining which do not work in the simple cases. The purpose is also to improve 
the models by exploring how a model might be changed to make it work better in the simple 
cases. General models, such as those applied to the very complicated economies found in the 
wild, must apply to simple special cases. Models that do not apply to the simple special cases are 
not general and thus cannot be viewed as such. The trick is to notice that economies created in the 
laboratories might be very simple relative to those found in nature, but they are just as real. Real 
people motivated by real money make real decisions, real mistakes and suffer real frustrations and 
delights because of their real talents and real limitations. Simplicity should not be confused with 
reality. Since the laboratory economies are real, the general principles and models that exist in 
the literature should be expected to apply with the same force to these laboratory economies as to 
those economies found in the field. The laboratories are simple but the simplicity is an advantage 
because it allows the reasons for a model's failure to be isolated and sometimes even measured. 
The process of learning is roundabout. The questions posed by experimentalists address the 
points of accuracy and the points of failure of general models and principles of economic behav- 
ior. Theories that predict relatively poorly in the laboratory are either rejected or refined. Models 
and principles that survive the laboratory can then be used to address questions about the field. 
Why something happened or what might happen in some naturally occurring economy are ques- 
tions addressed by models that have been refined by laboratory testing. It is the understanding of 
the nature of those models, some of their points of accuracy and failures, that can be gleaned 
from laboratory studies. Presumably this understanding helps with field applications. The labora- 
905 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 18:43:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
906 Charles R. Plott 
tory is not a source of direct simulation of what might happen in the field. The use of theory is 
an intervening stage. The learning process is roundabout. 
A recognition of this roundabout means of learning removed two intellectual constraints 
which together had made laboratory methods useless. The first was a belief that the only relevant 
economies to study are those in the wild. This belief suggested that the only effective way to create 
an experiment would be to mirror in every detail, to simulate, so to speak, some ongoing natural 
process. Early experimenters were guilty of yielding to this belief and described experiments as 
simulations of a market [21] or attempted to include in their experiments much of the rich and 
complicating detail found in many markets [9]. As a result the experiments tended to be dismissed 
either because as simulations the experiments were incomplete or because as experiments they 
were so complicated that tests of models were unconvincing. In other words, the experiment 
would be dismissed either because it did not mirror some natural process, or because it did. Once 
models, as opposed to economies, became the focus of research the simplicity of an experiment 
and perhaps even the absence of features of more complicated economies became an asset. The 
experiment should be judged by the lessons it teaches about theory and not by its similarity with 
what nature might happened to have created. 
The second constraint to the development of laboratory experiments was a belief about the 
proper way to test a theory. Typically a theory is viewed as being of the form "if x then y." 
Following this belief, the proper way to test a theory is to create a circumstance in which all 
of the assumptions of the theory are satisfied, the x part of the statement, and then conduct the 
experiment to see if y is the result. If y is not observed then the theory is rejected as being false. 
The problem with this methodology is not that it is wrong. The problem is that the assumptions 
of economic theories are seldom stated in operational terms and the theories themselves can be 
so vague that tests in the sense above are practically impossible. For example, a proposition fre- 
quently stated as an "assumption" of the competitive model is that each agent "believes" that 
his/her actions will have no effect on price. If the theory is stated in that form, then for practical 
purposes laboratory testing is impossible. In order to test the theory in that form, the experimenter 
must somehow know what exists in the minds of subjects. Since such data can never be known to 
the experimenter, the theory cannot be tested in the laboratory, in the field, or in any other way. 
The "if" part of the conditional cannot be known to be satisfied. 
Experimenters learned to sidestep this issue by posing tests as contests among competing 
models. The question posed by the experimenter evolved from a single question of the form "is 
this theory true?" to include questions like "which of these models best predicts what is observed 
in the simple experimental economies?"; or, to include a slight variant of that question "what are 
the circumstances under which the predictions of this theory/model improve or deteriorate?".' 
This new, broader set of questions is based upon the recognition that simple, special cases of 
economies are legitimate entities to study and that the predictive capacity of a theory or model 
might be unrelated to whether or not the assumptions are satisfied.2 By considering a broader set 
of questions than historically had been considered, experimentalists began to develop the art of 
posing questions that a laboratory experiment can answer. 
1. A clear early statement of this change in perspective to deal with many competing models is in Fiorina and 
Plott [4]. 
2. See Goodfellow and Plott [10] for a discussion of this issue. When a sharp differentiation between assumptions 
and principles is absent in the theory, the classical concept of testing a theory does not work. 
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Step 2: Some Important Discoveries Were Made 
During the very early years of experimentation, three very important discoveries were made. In 
some sense these establish a foundation for all subsequent work but they were not appreciated 
at the time. In fact, it is only recently, after many replications, and hundreds of experiments of 
different types, can we look back and recognize these early events as discoveries. 
Chamberlin [1] made major progress toward studying the law of supply and demand, 
although he really failed to recognize the nature and the importance of his discovery. Hoggatt 
[11], Sauermann and Selton [19, 20], Fouraker and Siegel [7] all discovered the power of the 
Nash equilibrium and Fouraker and Siegal were the first to use laboratory methods to study the 
influence of institutions. Veron Smith [21] discovered the operation of the law of supply and de- 
mand in open outcry markets. Figure 1 is simply one sort of replication of what Smith discovered. 
The decade following these early discoveries contains several important experiments but I think 
two discoveries in the early 1970s, both contained in the same paper [18], provide one of the keys 
to unlocking the door to understanding what happened at Step 2. 
The first discovery was that a concept of efficiency can be applied to evaluate and measure 
the performance of an experimental market. The discovery was simply that a cost/benefit analysis 
could be applied directly to experimental markets. The area under the demand curve is the amount 
paid to subjects by the experimenter. The area under the marginal cost curve is what subjects 
pay to the experimenter. The consumers' surplus plus the producers' surplus is maximum total 
earnings that subjects can get from participation. The gains from trade in the laboratory market 
are the subject payment cost of the experiment to the experimenter. If all gains from trade are ex- 
hausted, then as a group, subjects have earned the maximum total possible from the experiment. 
The efficiency with which the market facilitates the acquiring of such gain would be 100% in case 
the maximum is attained. The efficiency of market operations can then be measured by the actual 
payments to subjects divided by the maximum possible. In multiple market experiments with 
production, dollar payments may need to be replaced by other measures found in the welfare 
economics literature. 
This simple technique has very important applications. It can be used to measure the effi- 
ciency with which different institutions can operate to solve the same problem. Within a fixed 
economic environment (preferences and feasible sets), the experimenter can conduct different 
experiments with different institutions and compare the efficiencies. Thus, the technique pro- 
vides a way to compare and evaluate the performance of different institutional arrangements. It 
is especially important to notice that this comparative analysis can take place even though the 
experimenter may have no reasonable theory of why the institutions affect the markets as they 
do. Experiments can be useful even in the absence of theory. Experimentalists could proceed in 
meaningful directions even in cases in which the theory was not worked out at all. 
The second discovery was actually a rediscovery that institutions have an effect on market 
performance. This time, however, the institution and the effect were both clearly identified and 
the institution was not just any old institution. The institution was posted prices, similar to the 
rate posing process that have been used by the Department of Transportation and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission for years. Furthermore, the effect was not just any old effect. Posted 
prices cause prices to go up and efficiency to go down relative to what would be the case under 
an open-outcry system. Exactly why this occurs is still an open question although the best model 
developed so far is the mixed strategy solutions of a Bertrand game representation of the market. 
These two discoveries set the stage for the use of laboratory experimental methods in policy 
907 
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analysis. The efficiency measure and related concepts can be used to measure and identify the 
difference between competing modes of market organization. This comparison can proceed even 
if no good theoretical representation of processes exists. That is, the empirical work can pro- 
ceed in the absence of theory although the presence of theory certainly enhances its usefulness. 
Furthermore, since the posted price was an important variant of market regulatory machinery, the 
analysis could be focused directly on regulatory issues. Evaluation of the relative performance 
of market organizations in the laboratory provided a new source of insights about how such 
institutions might operate when implemented in the field. Laboratory-based policy analysis was 
made possible [12]. 
Step 3: Economic Theory Advanced 
The stunning changes in theory that took place in the late 1970s and 1980s do not need to be 
reviewed here. Information became a key variable and, with this variable, scientific interest in 
noncooperative game theory which, for practical purposes, was a dead subject prior to the late 
1970s, began to be stimulated. 
The newly developed tools of analysis suggested the existence of very subtle relationships 
among the actions taken by economic agents and the institutions in which they are operating. The 
implications of rationality of self and of others began to grow in importance. Efficiency began to 
expand from simple allocation efficiency to information efficiency and both began to depend criti- 
cally upon the ability of agents to assimilate information from complex data and the knowledge 
that others could do the same. Slight changes in institutional form could have dramatic implica- 
tions in terms of the predictions of the new game theoretic models. Critical features of models 
used in applications began to be so delicate that any testing in the field would be essentially 
hopeless. History does not often shape itself to suit the convenience of analysts who might like to 
test some of the very basic propositions about human actions and market behaviors that modem 
economic theory suggests might exist. 
The matrix game represented in Figure 3 will provide some intuition about the issues for 
those who are not versed in game theory. In that game the outcome in the lower right hand corer 
is a Nash equilibrium. If row player chooses B and column player chooses C, neither has an 
incentive to change given the choice of the other. How might the system get there? Row player 
can see that column player will not choose B because for column player, B is dominated by both 
columns A and C. Furthermore, row player understands that column player understands that if 
column B is not played, then for row player row A is dominated by row B. So, row player is not 
likely to play A. It follows that column will play C. By such repeated arguments that apply not 
only rationality of self but also rationality of others, and so forth, a presumption exists that the 
lower right hand corer will be the outcome. 
This role of rationality and public knowledge of rationality is an important feature of models 
and we will return to this feature of theory later. For now, it is sufficient to note that the choice 
of concepts of equilibrium used in a model can have an impact on predictions about the ulti- 
mate consequences of institutions on allocations. The example is really only illustrative of the 
issue. Modern theory has produced dozens of interesting new concepts of equilibrium and/or 
solution concepts, especially in cases in which the economic situation involves asymmetric infor- 
mation. Such theory also suggests the existence of what otherwise might be thought of as strange 
phenomena such as rational expectations equilibria. 
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I - 
A B C 
I 
A 20 -3 9 
10 100 7 
B 1 -1 2 
12 -10 8 
Figure 3. Matrix Game with Row Player and Column Player 
Even though the solution concepts might have dramatically different consequences for insti- 
tutional behavior, the data needed to distinguish between them, to determine which of them is the 
most accurate, can only be revealed at certain critical points of the decision making process. If the 
data can only come from the field, and from repeated observations of special circumstances found 
there, then the appropriate tests will probably never be conducted. The only practical source of 
data that can be obtained within an appropriate time frame and serve as a guide for many of the 
newly developed theories is the laboratory. 
Step 4: Laboratory Data Suggests that Theory Is on the Right Track 
It is one thing to say that the laboratory can be used as a source of data. It is very much another 
thing to say that something exists by way of theory that is worth the effort needed for a test. 
Experiments conducted in the late 1970s provided strong suggestions that modem theories were 
not completely hopeless and, indeed, appeared to be on the right track. 
Many examples exist. The law of supply and demand was well established by the late 1970s. 
The importance of the CORE of game representation of committee processes had also been well 
established by the late 1970s. Rational expectations had received strong support. In addition, the 
work with nonhuman animals in the early 1970s was extremely important because it leads directly 
to the hypothesis that a biological bases exists for the preference and optimization behavior that is 
so fundamental to modem theory. 
Perhaps the easiest examples to explain are the experiments with sealed bid auctions. The 
theory of auctions is one of the most completely developed theories in the social and economic 
sciences. The theory is well developed in the sense that the basic principles of game theory can 
be applied to create a model for which many of the definitions and assumptions can be made 
operational and implemented in an experimental environment. 
Consider an economic environment in which one unit of a good is sold by a sealed bid auc- 
tion process. The values of each of n bidders are drawn independently from a probability density 
function f(v). Having knowledge of his or her own value v and the knowledge that the value of 
others are drawn from the same p.d.f., the individual must tender a sealed bid. The item is then 
sold to the highest bidder at his/her bid. 
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Fundamental Approach 
Choose a bidfunction 
bid = b(value to you) 
bj= bj(vj) 
To maximize expected utility of wealth 
- j(Wj)= jr O<rl 
-f * . u (vj - bj) f (b( b(v),..., )) dvl,....dv, 
vj S b (vp | L Assume the values 
of others occur 
with a known 
probability distribution 
- Assume others follow the 
same strategy as you 
- 
find bj(vj) 
Figure 4. Sealed Bid Auction: Problem of Individual Choice 
The value of the object to each individual will, in general, be different. From the point 
of view of any single individual, the values of the other people are random with some known 
probability structure. Of course, the individual would like to purchase the object and obtain it at 
a low price. Specifically, if w is the wealth of the individual, and v is the value of the item to that 
individual, then the individual's utility given a winning bid at bid price b is u(w + v - b). The 
utility of the auction outcome if the individual fails to tender the winning bid is simply u (w). 
The problem faced by the individual who knows his/her own value v is to choose a bid. Since 
the bid depends upon the individual's value v, the implicit decision is the choice of a bid function 
b = b(v) indicating what the individual would do depending upon the circumstances. The indi- 
vidual knows that other individuals face the same task and will develop their own individual bid 
functions. 
The situation lends itself naturally to a game theoretic model. The theory is remarkably com- 
plex iff(v) is not uniform and if individuals are not risk neutral. From an individual's point of 
view, the problem is outlined in Figure 4. Each individual must choose a bid function, a "strategy" 
in game theoretic terms, from all of the bid functions that might be imagined (the "strategy set"). 
Each individual's payoff depends upon his/her own choice of strategy and the strategy choices 
of others. Under suitable conditions on the probability distribution that describes the distribution 
of values across agents and under suitable conditions on the individual attitudes toward risk, a 
Nash equilibrium of the implied game exists. These equilibrium bid functions can be computed 
and compared to the actual bid functions of people participating in auction experiments. 
Figure 5 displays three actual decisions of an individual in an auction experiment. Three 
people were competing.3 In this environment he values are drawn from 0 to $10. The probability 
that an individual's value is between 0 and $5 is .8 and the probability that the value is $5 or 
more is .2. Values within a range are equally likely. The first of the three draws by the individual 
was $2.45 and the resulting bid was $2.20 as shown on the figure. This was a winning bid so 
the profit of this individual was $.25. The bids of the other two subjects were $1.24 and $.30. 
Of course, the amounts of money were real and the individual kept all profits. On the second 
draw the individual received a value of $1.11 the bid was $1.00. The bids of the other two were 
3. Space prevents a detailed description of the experimental procedures and environments. For a detailed discussion 
of procedures see Cox, Roberson and Smith [2]. These data for the use of nonuniform distribution over values are part of 
a research project of Kay-Yut Chen and Charles Plott. 
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Bid 
400- 
200 - 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 
Value 
Figure 5. Drawn Values and Bid Choices 
$4.01 and $3.06 so the profit of this individual was zero. When the value drawn was $4.44 the 
individual bid was $3.47. As can be seen, the elements of a bidding function b(v) are beginning 
to appear in the figure. The question is whether or not the function is one predicted by theory. 
Figure 6 contains all of the bids made by this individual. It also contains two different solu- 
tions to the game theoretic representation of the auction process. The lowest, most inaccurate bid 
function is based upon the assumption that this individual and others are risk neutral. As can be 
seen, the model predicts areas in which nonlinearites might occur but the risk neutral model is 
certainly inaccurate quantitatively. The bids it predicts are much lower than actual bids. 
The second bid function is based upon the assumption that bidders are risk averse (constant 
relative risk aversion) with a random risk aversion parameter.4 The simple risk aversion parameter 
is estimated from the linear portion of the bid function. As is obvious from the figure, the model 
begins to take the shape of the data. The accuracy of the model when applied to other individuals' 
data is similar to the one in the figure. 
The point of this example is not that game theory has established some sort of iron law of 
behavior. The point is much more modest. The data from auction experiments, market experi- 
ments, committee experiments, etc. all have a common thread. Principles of economics and game 
theory lead to models that capture much of the essence of behavior. The data strongly suggest the 
existence of uniformities of behavior in complicated, competitive environments and that theory 
is on the right track. The data suggest that modem theorizing has been worth the effort. Theory 
appears to provide windows through which fundamental uniformities of human behavior can be 
viewed. Even though experimental work suggests that more theory is needed, the message that 
began to emerge from research in the late 1970s had clear and substantial positive elements. That 
positive message is an example of Step 4. 
4. See Cox, Smith and Walker [3] for the details of such a model. The solutions for the nonuniform distribution 
case are taken from the Chen and Plott project. 
911 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 18:43:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
912 Charles R. Plott 
Bid / 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 
Value 
Figure 6. Observe Bid Function and Theoretical Bid Function for One Individual 
Step 5: Paradoxes Begin to Appear 
When theory appears to be going in the right direction, the natural reaction of the scientist is to 
explore in those directions as far as possible. Some of the more important directions suggested 
by modem theory are those provided by principles of game theory. The questions posed by those 
who explore in such directions are whether or not the theory continues to be accurate when some 
of its more subtle implications are tested. A second and independent set of research directions 
is suggested by the procedures and institutions previously explored experimentally. The question 
posed is whether or not the stylized facts that emerged from the study of very simple environments 
continue to be observed as the institutions change and take on increasingly complex properties. 
Such experiments are checks on the robustness of previous results. Failures to obtain positive 
results in either direction are called "paradoxes" (as opposed to "rejected theories"). 
Paradoxes began to appear in many contexts. Three of the most fascinating will be consid- 
ered here. They are, in turn, the winner's curse, the behavior in centipede experiments, and the 
existence of bubbles in asset markets. These three are interesting because the theory that served 
well to explain behavior in closely related experiments predicts that the phenomena observed in 
these experiments cannot exist as a matter of principle. The very existence of the phenomena 
suggests the need for a reworking of theory at a very fundamental evel. 
Experiments in which the winner's curse is observed involve only a seemingly, slight altera- 
tion in the procedures of the first price auction experiments discussed in the section above. The 
structure is changed from a private value auction to a common value auction in which the value of 
the object sold is the same for all bidders. The value of the object is randomly determined. Each 
agent is then given a clue to the true value. The clue is drawn independently from a probability 
distribution that depends upon the true value. The agent must then determine a bid based upon 
the clue. 
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Figure 7. Common Value Auction: Value and Signal Relationship 
Our Ranae of Winning Actual 
Sample Possiblg Values Our Bid Bid Value 
100 [ 70, 130] 90 100 85 
136 [106,166] 126 160 160 
158 [128,188] 148 175 173 
182 [152, 212] 162 162 156 
Figure 8. Common Value Auction: Example of Information and Bids 
The winner's curse phenomena, first observed experimentally by Kagel and Levine [13] is 
that the winning bid is almost always above the true value of the item. That is, the auction winner 
almost always loses money. The existence of the phenomena creates a paradox because models 
constructed from the basic principles of game theory predict that the phenomena cannot exist. 
Figure 7 can help with an explanation of the experimental environment. In this experiment, 
the value of the item v was drawn uniformly from 0 to $500. Seven bidders tendered bids. The 
clue for each agent was drawn uniformly from v - $30 where v was the actual value of the item. 
If the winning bid was above v, then the winner lost money. If si is the clue received by indi- 
vidual i, the optimal bidding rule for risk neutral agents is b(si) = si - $30. In the example in 
the Figure, v is 180 and s = 165. The individual sees only 165 and knows that v E [135, 195]. 
Figure 8 contains some of the actual data from the point of view of one agent in an experi- 
ment conducted by Lind and Plott [15]. The Lind and Plott experiment, conducted in the spirit of 
distrust, was a replication of the Kagel and Levine experiment. The signal seen by the individual 
is called "our sample." The bid tendered by the individual is called "our bid." As can be seen, 
this individual never followed the optimal bidding rule. The bids of this agent and the bids of 
others were always too high. The table shows that this agent saw losses occurring repeatedly to 
other agents in auction after auction and in period 4 experienced a loss himself. 
The overbidding that contributes to the winner's curse phenomena is exhibited by almost all 
agents. It continues over repeated trials. When agents who exhibit Nash-type behavior in private 
value auctions are placed in common value auctions, the winner's curse immediately appears. 
913 
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Table I. Decisions in Centipede Game 
$ Amounts of Money .40 .80 1.60 3.20 6.40 12.80 25.60 
.10 .20 .40 .80 1.60 3.20 6.40 
Choosing Individual 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
Trials 1-5 
# of People Choosing 145 145 137 112 64 16 4 
Number of Terminations 0 8 25 48 48 12 
Probability of Termination 0 .06 .18 .43 .75 .81 
Trials 6-10 
# of People Choosing 136 134 124 93 33 10 1 
# of Terminations 2 10 31 60 23 9 
Probability of Termination .01 .07 .25 .65 .70 .90 
Source: Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey [16] 
How can individuals who otherwise appear so rational produce such "non-rational" behav- 
ior? That is the paradox. The resolution posed by Kagel and Levine was that individuals failed 
to properly compute an order statistic. If all individuals are rational, then bids increase with the 
value of the clue. This means that the individual with the largest clue (which will almost certainly 
be above the value of the item) will win the auction. The bid must then be properly discounted 
from the clue to reflect the fact that if the bid wins, then the clue was the most extreme above 
the value of the object. The proposed resolution of the paradox is that individuals may be rational 
but they fail to anticipate and incorporate the rationality of others into their decisions. They fail 
to realize that they will win the auction only when they have the highest signal and/or they fail to 
discount by the appropriate order statistic. 
The second example is called the centipede game. In this process, two individuals participate 
in a finite sequence of moves that involve options of the following sort. The first person has an 
option of two amounts of money {x, y } with the property that x > 2y. If the chooser takes one of 
the amounts of money, the process ends with the choosing agent keeping the amount taken and 
the other agent receiving the other amount. If the first agent passes, then both amounts of money 
are doubled and the second player has the choice between {2x, 2y} or passing back to player one 
and allowing both amounts to double. If players continue to pass, then at the kth decision the 
amounts will be {2kx, 2ky}. The process is known (publicly) to terminate at decision T at which 
point the choosing agent must choose the higher of {2Tx, 2Ty} and does not have an option 
to pass. 
A natural game theoretic representation of the process is a game with perfect information. 
The Nash equilibrium of such a game is for the first chooser to take the largest amount and termi- 
nate the game immediately. This result follows by backward induction from the terminal period, 
the perfect information, and the "rationality" of both players. The T - 1 player should recognize 
that he or she will get the smaller amount if "pass" is chosen and, therefore, would choose to take 
the larger amount at T - 1 and stop the game. However, the T - 2 player anticipates that and 
so would terminate at T - 2. The logic works its way back to t = 0. Interest in the game stems 
directly from the lack of intuitive appeal of the (only) Nash equilibrium. 
Experiments with the centipede game conducted by McKelvey and Palfrey [16] started with 
the amounts {$.40, $. 10} and continued for a maximum of seven decisions ending with a maxi- 
mum of {$25.60, $6.40}. Contrary to the perfect information game theoretic model, agents do 
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not take the cash and terminate the game on the first move. However, as agents have more experi- 
ence, the terminations occur earlier. The table contains the relevant statistics from the McKelvey 
and Palfrey study. The data are partitioned into two sets according to subject experience with 
the game. Each subject participated in 10 trials (each trial could involve up to seven decisions). 
At the first trial subjects had no previous experience. At the 10th trial subjects had played the 
game 9 previous times with 9 different people. In the table the results of trials 1-5 are presented 
separately from trials 6-10. 
First notice that the probability of termination at stage 1 is not 100% as predicted by theory. 
In trials 1-5 no game terminated at the first choice. In trials 6-10 only 2 of 136 people, or 1%, 
chose to terminate at the first move as theory predicts. However, as can be seen, the probability of 
having terminated by a given stage in trials 1-6 stochastically dominates the probability of having 
terminated in that same stage in trials 1-5. Even the rate of termination is higher at all stages 
except the 5th stage. 
Such data present an obvious puzzle. Are principles at work which cause behavior to con- 
verge with experience toward Nash play? The Nash play captures some of the behavior in the 
sense that terminations occur substantially prior to the final round. But certainly the Nash equilib- 
rium model does not exactly describe everything that happens. How can the model be modified 
to account for what is observed? As can be seen, the puzzles and paradoxes begin to emerge as 
both theory and experiments become more sophisticated. 
The final example is the behavior of asset markets. Early experiments with asset markets by 
Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott [5; 6] gave clear support for rational expectations. The assets studied 
had two-period lives and the dividends involved no random component. The environment was 
complicated by Friedman, Harrison and Salman [8] to include a three-period life and random 
dividends. The results did not differ substantially from those of Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott. Moti- 
vated by these early results, Smith, Suchanek and Williams [22] decided to explore assets with 
long lives and random dividends. Experimentation under generalizations of existing procedures 
and environments is a natural thing to do. 
The asset studied by Smith, Suchanek and Williams had a fifteen-period life. Each period 
it paid a dividend which was drawn with equal probabilities from the set {$.60, $.28, $.08, 0}. 
Thus the expected dividend each period was $.24. At period 1 the expected dividend stream was 
$.24 x 15 = $3.60 and in period 2 the expected value is $.24 less. The middle curve in Figure 9 
shows the "fundamental value" of the asset. If the asset paid the maximum possible dividend 
($.60) throughout life (a very unlikely event), then the value would be the top curve in the figure. 
The dots in the figure are contracts executed through a computerized market. As can be seen, 
the assets began trading at prices slightly below the expected value and in period 2 prices are near 
the expected value. However, by period 3 the assets were trading above expected value. Prices 
increased slowly from period to period even though the expected value was falling. By period 10 
the assets were trading at prices equal to the maximum possible yield and by period 11 prices 
were above the maximum possible yield. Such high prices could not have been due to optimism 
about fundamental values. In period 14 a violent market crash occurred as prices fall to levels 
near the expected value. The time series clearly demonstrates the properties of a bubble and a 
market crash. 
A puzzle emerges. How can markets populated with rational agents have such properties? 
How can the models be changed to account for this phenomena? 
The experimental literature and the theoretical literature contain some hints about possible 
solutions to all three paradoxes, the winner's curse, the centipede and asset market bubbles. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 18:43:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
0.000 ll ly 34Fig 3 Asset M1259 
Figure 9. Asset Market Price Time Series 
4921 2174 
Period / Time 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 18:43:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WILL ECONOMICS BECOME AN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE? 917 
Rationality of agents might not be public information. Each agent might be rational but might 
also be unsure about the rationality of others. Perhaps the rationality of others is only learned by 
experience. Recall, in the centipede game, experience seemed to foster more Nash-like behavior. 
People seemed to learn that other people were prepared to defect. Similarly, the "bigger fool" 
beliefs could account for asset market bubbles. If an agent believes that he or she can sell the 
asset to someone else for the same price next period, then the dividend is obtained free. In the 
bubble experiments experience in asset markets makes the bubble "pop" sooner and after three 
or four such market experiences, the bubbles almost completely disappear. The fact that "bigger 
fools" do not exist may become public information with experience in the market. Even the early 
experiments by Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott exhibited properties that the authors called the "swing 
back hypothesis"-repeated experiences with final-period behavior become incorporated in the 
earlier decisions as agents deal repeatedly over the lifetimes of assets. 
The suggested solution to the paradoxes is only speculation. However, if it is taken seriously 
it motivates a host of related questions. Do special market instruments exist (futures markets, 
options markets) that make public the rationality of individuals? If "irrationality" exists, exactly 
how might it be integrated into the models? The ideas suggested by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts 
and Wilson [14] provide a start. The model developed by McKelvey and Palfrey to explain the 
centipede game depends heavily on such ideas. However, few people believe that theory should 
end with the "gang of four" paper and I should emphasize again that this proposed solution is not 
the only idea that exists. 
Step 6: Say's Law of Experimental Methods Takes Over 
The famous law of J. B. Say, that supply creates its own demand, seems applicable to the case of 
experimental research. The application of experimental methods generates research questions that 
can only be answered by a more intense use of experimental methods. The supply of experimental 
research creates a demand for even more experimental research. When Say's law of experimental 
methods takes over, the stage is set for an ever increasing tendency to use experiments. The stage 
becomes set for economics to slowly but surely become a laboratory experimental science. 
The sections above illustrate how it has happened in one case. Experiments suggest that 
moder theory is on the right track (Step 4). Models based on principles of game theory clearly 
receive much support in the experimental literature. When applied to simple cases, such models 
are more accurate than any theory found in any branch of any other science that might be applied 
to those cases. However, paradoxes exist (Step 5). Phenomena exist that are clearly beyond the 
explanatory capacities of moder models. But the existence of such phenomena does not mean 
that theory should stop. Versions of the theory that might readily account for the phenomena by 
removing the central role of publicness of rationality already exist in the literature. Such theories 
are not particularly well developed and must be appended by special theories of information and 
learning. Considerably more experimental work will be necessary to determine if changes in the 
rationality postulates are the correct way to push theory and to narrow the options from the many 
different forms that such theory might take. This need for new experiments brings us to Step 6. 
The supply of experimental research creates a demand for more experimental research. 
I'm reminded of the joke about the man who was talking with his physician after having 
taken a series of tests the week before. The physician first tells the man the good news: "The 
test report said that you would die in twenty-four hours." Shocked and outraged, the man yells 
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"How can you say that? How can that be good news? What could possibly be the bad news?" 
The physician looks at him sadly. "The bad news is," says the physician, "we got the test results 
yesterday." 
To those who are not enthusiastic about the use of laboratory experimental methods, the 
prohibitionists so to speak, the good news is that the profession has tasted the devil's brew, the 
use of experimental methods, and likes it. "If that is the good news, what on earth could be 
the bad news?", the prohibitionists might ask. The bad news is that all six of the seductive steps 
to sin and intoxication have occurred in almost every subfield of economics. Those who have 
not been touched are being tempted. Say's law of experimental methods seems to be operating 
everywhere. The impact might not be noticeable yet but the process is operating. 
Let me be clear about my answer to the question posed by the title of this paper. I do not 
believe that experimental methods will replace field research. Economies found in the wild can 
only be understood by studying them in the wild. Field research is absolutely critical to such 
an understanding. However, the theories and models used in field research necessarily incorpo- 
rate many judgments about assumptions, parameters and behavioral principles. The simple cases 
that can be studied in the laboratory can provide the data against which the importance of such 
judgments can be assessed. Economics is one of the few sciences that is fortunate to have both 
the field and the laboratory with which to work. The thesis of this paper is that the laboratory 
methodology, which has historically been absent, will grow apd become an important partner in 
a joint effort to isolate the principles which govern economic behavior. 
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